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Abstract6
Climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that the Earth is getting warmer and
that the rise in average global temperature is predominantly due to human ac-
tivity. Yet a significant proportion of the American public, as well as a consider-
able number of legislators in the U.S. Congress, continue to reject the “consensus
view.” While the source of the disagreement is varied, one prominent explana-
tion centres on the activities of a coordinated and well-funded countermovement
of climate sceptics. This study contributes to the literature on organized cli-
mate scepticism by providing the first systematic update of conservative think
tank counter-claims in nearly 15 years. Specifically, we 1) compile the largest
corpus of climate sceptic claims-making activity to date, collecting over 16,000
documents from 19 organizations over the period 1998 to 2013; 2) introduce a
methodology to measure key themes in the corpus which scales to the substan-
tial increase in content generated by conservative think tanks (CTTs) over the
past decade; and 3) leverage this new methodology to shed light on the relative
prevalence of science- and policy-related discussion among CTTs. We find little
support for the claim that “the era of science denial is over”—instead, discussion
of climate science has generally increased over the sample period.
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1. Introduction9
Climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that the Earth is getting warmer10
and that the rise in average global temperature is predominantly due to human11
activity (IPCC 2014, National Research Council 2010, Oreskes 2004, Doran and12
Zimmerman 2009, Anderegg et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2013). Yet a sizeable seg-13
ment of the American public rejects this “consensus view” (Weber and Stern14
2011) and U.S. climate policy remains in a state of limbo. As of early 2015,15
one-third of the American public believes that climate change is not primarily16
caused by human activity and only one in ten understands that more than 90% of17
climate scientists agree on the existence and nature of observed global warming18
(Leiserowitz et al. 2015). What explains this divergence in views among climate19
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scientists and the American public? What factors promote inaction on compre-20
hensive climate mitigation policy? These questions have garnered considerable21
attention in disciplines across the social and behavioural sciences.22
One prominent explanation investigates the influence of a “well-funded and23
relatively coordinated ‘denial machine’” on shaping the public’s understanding24
of climate science (Begley et al. 2007). While a diverse set of actors promote cli-25
mate scepticism, conservative think tanks (CTTs) play a central role, providing26
key counter-claims to challenge climate science and obstructing climate policy27
(McCright and Dunlap 2000). CTTs provide a multitude of services to the cause28
of climate change scepticism: providing material support and lending credibility29
to contrarian scientists, sponsoring pseudo-scientific climate change conferences,30
directly communicating contrarian viewpoints to politicians, and, more gener-31
ally, disseminating sceptic viewpoints through a range of media to the wider32
public (Dunlap and McCright 2011). A number of studies also suggest that33
these organizations are central in obstructing national climate policy (Lahsen34
2008, Oreskes and Conway 2010) and international climate change mitigation35
agreements (McCright and Dunlap 2003). The prominence of CTTs in the con-36
trarian counter-movement has prompted calls for an expansion and improvement37
of data collection efforts on a range of climate movement and counter-movement38
activities (Brulle et al. 2012).39
Despite an active interest in CTTs, few studies have systematically analysed40
the nature and prevalence of contrarian counter-claims. Aaron McCright and41
Riley Dunlap’s influential study offers a notable exception, providing a compre-42
hensive survey of CTT counter-claims from 14 major conservative think tanks43
over the period 1990-1997. Yet, to our knowledge, there have been no systematic44
updates to this study over the past 15 years and thus little is known about how45
contrarian claims have evolved over the last decade. We seek to fill this gap46
in the literature by 1) compiling the largest corpus of climate sceptic claims-47
making activity to date, collecting over 16,000 documents from 19 organizations48
over the period 1998 to 2013; 2) introducing a methodology to measure key49
themes in the corpus which scales to the exponential increase in content gener-50
ated by conservative think tanks (CTTs) over the past decade; and 3) leveraging51
this new methodology to examine the dynamics of policy- and science-related52
claims over a 16 year period. We argue that understanding CTT counter-claims53
is of both theoretical and practical significance, as an acceptance of the anthro-54
pogenic causes of climate change is arguably a necessary condition for progress55
on reaching a climate agreement and may portend a window for policy action.56
2. Understanding contrarian counter-claims57
A number of scholars argue that the entrenchment of climate change scep-58
ticism in American society is not an “accident.” Rather, the dismal state of59
public understanding of AGW in the United States is largely the result of an60
orchestrated attack on climate science and individual climate scientists by a61
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constellation of interests that are determined to obstruct policies aimed at miti-62
gating global warming (Pooley 2010, Oreskes and Conway 2010, Washington and63
Cook 2011, Mann 2013). For over twenty years, the American public has been64
subject to waves of information produced by a “well-coordinated, well-funded65
campaign by contrarian scientists, free-market think tanks and industry” which66
has “created a paralyzing fog of doubt around climate change” (Begley et al.67
2007). Employing tactics (and even participants) from similar disinformation68
campaigns, such as those against the regulation of tobacco and ozone-harming69
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the counter-movement aims to block climate policy70
by “manufacturing doubt” about the credibility of individual scientists, misrep-71
resenting peer-reviewed scientific findings, and exaggerating scientific uncertain-72
ties (Union of Concerned Scientists 2007, Oreskes and Conway 2010, Greenpeace73
2010, Dunlap and McCright 2011).74
While there are a number key actors in what Begley et al. (2007) refer to75
as the “denial machine” (see Dunlap and McCright 2011 for an overview), the76
“engine” of information centres on a number of influential CTTs. CTTs seek77
to manufacture uncertainty in two important ways. First, sceptics have im-78
plemented a campaign to re-frame the issue of climate change, shifting the79
story away from consensus and the urgent need for action toward one of “non-80
problematicity” (Freudenburg 2000, McCright and Dunlap 2003). Communica-81
tions research repeatedly emphasizes the sensitivity of public perceptions to how82
an issue is framed within the wider information space (Lakoff 2014, Scheufele83
and Tewksbury 2007). And given the inherent complexity of climate change,84
“interpretive storylines” surrounding the issue are ripe for manipulation by par-85
ties on either side of the debate (Nisbet 2009). Second, relying on their image86
as the “alternative academia” or “counter-intellegentsia,” CTTs play a lead role87
in constructing viewpoints to challenge orthodox views on climate science and88
policy (Beder 2001, Austin 2002, Jacques et al. 2008, Dunlap and Jacques 2013).89
CTT-affiliated contrarian scientists and commentators have generated and dis-90
seminated numerous counter-claims against climate science and policy action91
through various forms of media, including books, op-eds, newsletters, policy92
studies, speeches and press releases (McCright and Dunlap 2000, Jacques et al.93
2008, Dunlap and Jacques 2013).94
Studies interested in measuring the prevalence of contrarian claims focus al-95
most exclusively on the level of contrarian information present in media coverage96
of global warming. These studies have yielded important insights into the preva-97
lence of skepticism within newspapers (e.g., Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, Painter98
and Ashe 2012, Schmidt et al. 2013), opinion pieces in print media (Hoffman99
2011, Elsasser and Dunlap 2013, Young 2013), television (Boykoff 2008, Hart100
2008, Feldman et al. 2012), and “new media” (ONeill and Boykoff 2011, Hol-101
liman 2011, Knight and Greenberg 2011, Sharman 2014, Elgesem et al. 2015).102
However, few studies systematically analyse the content of contrarian claims103
and even fewer focus specifically on CTTs. To date, McCright and Dunlap104
(2000) offers the most comprehensive survey of CTT counter-claims on climate105
change. The authors content analyse a sample of 224 documents related to106
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global warming from 14 major conservative think tanks over the period 1990-107
1997, with the vast majority of this literature being produced during 1996 and108
1997. Overall, the analysis suggests that climate scepticism during this period109
centred on three major counter-claims: 1) the evidentiary basis of global warm-110
ing is weak or wrong, 2) global warming would be beneficial if it was to occur,111
and 3) global warming policies would do more harm than good (see McCright112
and Dunlap 2000 pg. 510, Table 3). For the 1990-1997 period, the study finds113
that 71% of the documents contained criticisms of the scientific evidence for114
global warming (Counter-claim 1), only 13.4% discussed the benefits of global115
warming (Counter-claim 2), and 62.1% provided a discussion on the downsides116
of climate policy action (Counter-claim 3).117
McCright and Dunlap’s study provides a unique look at sceptical counter-118
claims in the mid-to-late 1990s, yet much less is known about how these claims119
have evolved. Several studies provide a more recent look at the key features of120
the contrarian discourse more generally. Elsasser and Dunlap (2013) employed121
John Cook’s list of sceptical arguments (www.skepticalscience.com) to classify122
203 op-eds over the period 2007-2010. The authors find that personal attacks123
on Al Gore and scepticism of the IPCC were common throughout the corpus,124
while “it’s not happening” arguments dominated the discussion, showing up in125
almost two thirds of the articles. Sharman (2014) examines the climate skeptic126
blogosphere from March to April of 2012, classifying 171 blog posts as either127
science- or policy-oriented. The author finds that blogs which are “central” in the128
blogosphere network tended to focus on discussions of science, while peripheral129
blogs tended to emphasise policy. Lastly, and more in line with the current130
study, in a content analysis of documents from the Heartland Institute over the131
period September-December 2013 (n = 102), Cann (2015) finds a considerable132
drop in discussions of policy when compared to the findings of McCright and133
Dunlap (2000). As the author acknowledges, however, it is difficult to determine134
whether this indicates a general move away from policy-oriented claims or is135
simply a sampling issue associated with focusing on a single organisation for a136
two month period. More generally, this limitation applies equally to the analysis137
of op-eds and blogs as well: the existing evidence provides segmented glimpses of138
the evolution of contrarian claims over the past decade and a half. The remainder139
of this study seeks to overcome this limitation by providing a comprehensive look140
at CTT claim-making activity.141
3. Measuring contrarian claims142
3.1. The corpus143
To systematically gauge claims-making activity, we retrieved information re-144
lated to climate change from the websites of 19 well-known North American145
conservative think tanks and organizations (see online appendix for details).146
Our choice of organizations, to a large extent, mirrors that of McCright and147
Dunlap (2000) and the most heavily funded organizations which are identified148
in Brulle (2014). For each organization, we visited all pages including the terms149
4
“climate change” or “global warming” and extracted relevant text and key meta150
data. There were also instances where pages included links to documents in PDF151
format, which were typically relatively long policy reports. These PDFs were152
automatically retrieved, passed through optical character recognition (OCR)153
software to extract the text, and appended to the list of text retrieved from the154
HTML code. Audiovisual materials were a minority of the overall set of retrieved155
pages and were excluded in the current analysis. This process produced more156
than 16,000 documents over the period from 1998 to 2013.157
Table 1 provides an overview of the organizations included in the sample. The158
first two columns display the total number of words and documents published159
online by each organization over the period of study. To provide a general sense of160
the types of output, the next five columns provide a tabulation of the documents161
by type, following the classification scheme used in (McCright and Dunlap 2000,162
p. 508). Relying heavily on meta-data provided within the URL or the document163
itself, we categorize the documents by five general types: (A) op-eds, articles and164
blogs, (B) policy/science reports and analyses, (C) speech/interview transcripts,165
(D) press releases/open letters, and (E) scientific reviews. More information on166
the document type coding procedure is available in the online appendix.167
The table provides a number of insights into the claims-making behaviour168
of the most important CTTs. First, these organisations have increased their169
production and dissemination of literature exponentially, from roughly 203 doc-170
uments over the period 1990-1997 (McCright and Dunlap 2000) to 16,028 docu-171
ments for the years 1998-2013. Second, the distribution of the document classi-172
fications suggests that the communication strategy of these organizations varies.173
Several organisations focus on producing shorter, op-ed style documents (e.g,174
NCPA), while others focus on producing lengthier policy or science-related re-175
ports (e.g, George C. Marshall Institute). Third, as expected based on past176
research, the Heartland Institute is a central actor among CTTs, producing or177
disseminating a significant portion of the documents in the corpus and focusing178
on a mix of short articles and longer policy reports. We take a closer look at179
the claims-making trends of Heartland in Section 6.180
3.2. Methods: probabilistic topic modelling181
The time and effort associated with reading over 16,000 documents renders182
traditional content analytic approaches inadequate and/or infeasible and thus183
the next step is to find a suitable computational model to help make sense of184
the data. We approach this step using an unsupervised approach, exploring185
the presence of meaningful clusters of terms that appear across documents in186
the collected corpus. While there is no shortage of clustering algorithms in the187
literature (Grimmer and King 2011), we utilize the latent Dirichlet allocation188
(LDA) model originally proposed in Blei et al. (2003). LDA provides a statistical189
framework for understanding the latent topics or themes running through a190
corpus by explicitly modelling the random process responsible for producing191
a document. The LDA model assumes that each document is made up of a192
mixture of topics, as well as a mixture of words associated with each topic. For193
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Document Type
Organization Name Total Total A B C D E
Words Docs.
(thous.)
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 1,872.53 745 596 61 48 15 25
Cato Institute 772.68 768 712 41 8 6 1
Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide 2,387.27 4,592 713 0 0 1 3,878
and Global Change (CO2Science)
Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) 1,743.02 1,461 941 55 0 465 0
Committee for a Constructive 738.52 894 882 12 0 0 0
Tomorrow (CFACT)
Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE) 88.2 111 105 6 0 0 0
Fraser Institute 78.39 81 62 19 0 0 0
Foundation for Research on Economics 76.64 105 105 0 0 0 0
and the Environment (Free-Eco)
Heartland Institute 9,900.54 2,930 1,383 1,537 10 0 0
Heritage Foundation 1,825.78 1,652 1,198 431 23 0 0
Hoover Institution 51.06 37 3 32 2 0 0
Hudson Institute 124.61 83 81 2 0 0 0
Manhattan Institute 315.59 199 183 13 3 0 0
George C. Marshall Institute 209.75 101 69 21 11 0 0
National Center for Policy 469.78 451 376 75 0 0 0
Analysis (NCPA)
National Center for Public 393.54 639 378 90 0 171 0
Policy Research (NCPPR)
Pacific Research Institute 384.68 435 402 7 0 26 0
Reason Foundation 397.12 192 179 13 0 0 0
Science and Public Policy Institute (SPPI) 3,064.88 552 0 552 0 0 0
Total 24,894.58 16,028 8,368 2,967 105 684 3,904
Table 1: Climate sceptic organizations. The table displays the total count of words
(thousands), the number, and type of documents from 19 well-known conservative
think-tanks over the period January 1998 – August 2013. Documents have been classi-
fied as follows: (A) op-eds, articles and blogs; (B) policy/science reports and analyses;
(C) speech/interview transcripts; (D) press releases/open letters; (E) scientific reviews.
instance, the document you are reading at this moment includes a mixture of194
themes such as “climate scepticism” and “text analysis,” and these themes tend195
to use different language—the topic “climate scepticism” is likely associated with196
the word “denial,” whereas the topic “text analysis” is associated with the word197
“random.” Moreover, this process is probabilistic in the sense that we could have198
used the term “stochastic” instead of “random” in the previous sentence.199
This basic generative story provides the basis for a simple hierarchical Bayesian200
model based on the following assumptions: 1) each word in a text is exchange-201
able, each text in a corpus is a combination of a specific number of topics (Tk),202
and each specific topic is represented as a distribution of words (w) over a fixed203
vocabulary (Blei et al. 2003, Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). The generative struc-204
ture that produces each document in a corpus is represented as random mixtures205
of latent topics and their associated distributions of words. Specifically, the LDA206
assumes that documents are generated from the following probabilistic process:207
1. Each of the k topics are drawn from a topic distribution by208
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θ ∼ Dirichlet(α)209
2. The term distribution β for each topic is represented by210
β ∼ Dirichlet(η)211
3. For each of the N words wn:212
Randomly sample a topic zn ∼Multinomial(θ).213
Choose a word wn from p(wn|zn, β).214
Although this model provides an overly simplified representation of the true215
data generating process for text, it has been shown to be effective in applied216
situations and employed in a diverse range of fields, from population biology to217
information retrieval (see Blei 2012 for an overview).218
3.2.1. How many topics?219
LDA requires one to specify the number of topics a priori. This presents220
an obvious challenge when studying contrarian counter-claims, as past research221
suggest anywhere from 9 claims (McCright and Dunlap 2000) to 176 “debunked222
climate myths” (www.skepticalscience.com). While a range of methods have223
been introduced in the literature to estimate the “natural” number of topics224
(see Wallach et al. 2009b for an overview), there remains considerable debate on225
the utility of data-driven approaches for generating interpretable topics (Chang226
et al. 2009). Moreover, when applying probabilistic topic models to understand227
social phenomena, the “natural” number of topics is conditional on the particular228
research question of interest. If answering your question requires a high degree229
of detail, then using a larger number of topics is advisable; otherwise, little230
substantively meaningful information is lost by assuming a smaller number of231
topics (Quinn et al. 2010, Roberts et al. 2014).232
With little theoretical guidance on the appropriate number of topics, we233
employ a balanced approach between data-driven methods and a qualitative234
assessment of the interpretability of the latent space. First, we rely on the topic235
selection criteria proposed in Arun et al. (2010), which has proven an effective236
heuristic for determining a reasonable topic number in both real and synthetic237
datasets (see the online appendix for technical details). Using the Arun et al.238
procedure as a starting point, we then systematically adjusted the assumed topic239
number (k) around the “optimal” data-driven result and manually assessed the240
quality of the topic solutions. While the details of this analysis are available in241
the online appendix, we find that k = 53 offers a suitable balance between having242
a manageable number of topics, enough detail to assess core substantive themes243
in climate contrarianism, displaying a reasonable level of “fit” using data-driven244
methods, and demonstrating stability across a range of solutions.245
4. Results246
4.1. Model estimation and topic interpretation247
We estimate the model using the sparse Gibbs sampler described in Yao248
et al. (2009) and the hyperparameter optimization routine utilized in Wallach249
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et al. (2009a). Consistent with the findings in Wallach et al. (2009a), we found250
that optimizing α, while fixing β, provided the easiest results to interpret and251
thus employ this specification. Moreover, given that mixture models such as the252
LDA are known to produce multimodal likelihood surfaces, we used a number253
of different random starting values. We found a good deal of stability in the254
estimated topic distributions across runs, improving our confidence that the255
model converged on a global optimum.256
After removing 6 “junk” topics (AlSumait et al. 2009),1 our final list in-257
cludes 47 substantively meaningful topics representing a range of issues related258
to global warming. Table 2 provides a complete list of the estimated topics of259
the sceptical discourse. To ease interpretation, we produce a descriptive label for260
each topic by reading the 10 most probable documents and noting the key theme261
consistent within each sub-sample. The descriptive labels not only provide use-262
ful information to facilitate topic interpretation, but also offer a first look at one263
aspect semantic validity : the extent to which each topic is coherent in terms of264
its meaning (Quinn et al. 2010). We also include a set of keywords for each topic265
based on the word’s “frequency-exclusivity” (FREX), as described in Roberts266
et al. (2014). FREX offers a balance between the probability (or “frequency”) of267
a word being associated with a particular topic and the extent to which a word268
is unique to a topic (i.e., “exclusivity”).269
Looking at the full list of topics shown in Table 2, the results demonstrate a270
good level of face validity and are generally consistent with the themes discussed271
in McCright and Dunlap (2000). These topics touch on a wide range of themes272
such as scientific integrity and uncertainty, climate change impacts, energy, en-273
vironmental policy, society, as well as domestic and international politics. And,274
as expected, the corpus is rife with claims surrounding the uncertainty of cli-275
mate scientific studies. The notion that human activity, specifically the emission276
of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, is leading to a rise in global tempera-277
tures (topic 1) has been characterized as suffering from a “real-world disconnect”278
(Heartland Institute, Nov. 11, 2011) and any discussion to the contrary amounts279
to “alarmism” (Heartland Institute, May 17, 2013). Further, the general agree-280
ment of scientists on this relationship is repeatedly refuted within the corpus281
(topic 4) as there is “no consensus on climate change” (NCPR, March 22, 2004).282
Appeals to long-term natural cycles in temperature (topic 5), as purportedly283
demonstrated by the Roman and Medieval Warm Periods, are common support284
for arguments against anthropogenic global warming. This topic is of particular285
interest as it was not detected in McCright and Dunlap (2000) and has become286
a common claim among climate sceptics. Studies that support anthropogenic287
global warming are also deemed to be “fabricated” and have led to a “childish288
panic.” Typical examples of these arguments include:289
1AlSumait et al. (2009) note that not all topics in an estimated topic model are of equal
importance and it is not uncommon to have a set of “junk” topics that pick up common
co-occurrences of words with little or no substantive meaning.
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Id S/P Topic Name Id S/P Topic Name
42 S Acidification calcif reef bleach coral phytoplankton 20 P Corporations & env. borelli sharehold greenpeac donor philanthropi
16 S Alarmism gore morano romm inconveni depot 43 P Disaster costs insur pension mortgag florida premium
11 S Climate models simul gcm model cmip coupl 25 P Economic impact of climate policy baselin discount sector eia mit
1 S Climate sensitivity to CO2 warm degre cool dioxid warmer 29 P Emissions reduction carbon scheme credit trade dioxid
46 S Endangered species butterfli stirl extinct bear polar 10 P Environmentalism lomborg holdren ehrlich evangel simon
34 S Forest impacts npp ndvi shrub peatland finzi 38 P EPA caa epa endanger naaq anpr
19 S Human health ddt precautionari malaria diseas cancer 2 P Fossil fuel production shale barrel oil drill pipelin
27 S IPCC integrity chapter ipcc tsd wg summari 15 P Govt. agencies fy sec gao omb provis
5 S Long-term climate trends holocen millenni quaternari mediev palaeo 9 P Govt. intervention approach intervent principl geoengin outcom
26 S Monckton monckton graph ppmv brenchley humankind 24 P Green jobs job stimulu taxpay subsidi green
4 S No scientific consensus consensu denier oresk agw scientif 44 P Int’l climate agreements kyoto protocol treati ratifi ratif
30 S Plant impacts seedl leaf mycorrhiz cultivar elev 17 P Int’l relations militari nato missil afghanistan iran
45 S Pollution mercuri ozon toxic asthma particul 31 P Int’l trade & develop india china chines wto asia
14 S Scientific misconduct cru mcintyr mann hockey email 39 P Law court judici lawsuit constitut suprem
3 S Sea level rise antarct greenland glacier melt antarctica 23 P Nuclear power hydrogen reactor nuclear technolog cell
12 S Solar forcing & cloud models cosmic cloud radiat ray aerosol 6 P Public opinion gallup abc pew cnn cb
40 S State climate reports viru cessat nile wigley inch 36 P Public transportation rail ridership travel passeng vmt
28 S Storms cyclon storm hurrican tc frequenc 8 P Renewable energy rp turbin renew wind megawatt
13 S Temperature station data station giss ushcn fig thermomet 22 P Reuse & recycle bag mtbe bulb cfl reus
18 P Agri. Industry corn ethanol biofuel farmer sugar 41 P State climate policy ghg jersey greenhous wefa rggi
47 P Auto. fuel standards cafe nhtsa mpg vehicl car 32 P Tax & spend tax dividend incom fiscal medicaid
35 P Cap & trade markey waxman lieberman warner cap 21 P Urban econ. california ab metropolitan schwarzenegg californian
37 P Climate adaptation goklani adapt stern mitig resili 7 P US politics republican sen mccain democrat vote
33 P Conservation timber eagl fisheri perc graze
Table 2: A full list of the estimated topics. The table provides each topic’s unique ID, descriptive label (in bold), and top 5 stemmed
keywords based on the FREX score (Roberts et al. 2014). Further, based on the findings from the topic similarity analysis in Section
5.1, we code whether each topic is related to climate science (S) or climate politics & policy (P).
Global temperatures have been flat for approximately 15 years now, even though290
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels rose more than 40 ppm (or more than 10291
percent) during that time. Rather than being a harbinger of doom and gloom,292
the approaching 400 ppm carbon dioxide threshold presents still more evidence293
that humans are not creating a global warming crisis (Heartland Institute, May294
17, 2013).295
The existence of the [Medieval Warm Period] had been recognized in the sci-296
entific literature for decades. But now it was a major embarrassment to those297
maintaining that the 20th century warming was truly anomalous. It had to be298
“gotten rid of” (NCPA, Dec. 6, 2006).299
Many documents also suggest alternate climate forcing inputs such as the sun300
or cosmic rays (topic 12) as more plausible explanatory factors for climate fluc-301
tuations than greenhouse gas emissions. The validity and reliability of empirical302
data used in climate change studies (topic 13) to demonstrate global warming303
impacts are cast into doubt. Further, the underlying assumptions of climate304
change models (topic 11) that are referenced in the IPCC assessments are of305
“dubious merit” (Fraser, July 7, 2004).306
The results of the LDA model also demonstrate the breadth of topics dis-307
cussed in documents referencing climate change with important issue linkages308
across both the domestic and international political economy. Much critical309
discussion surrounds international mitigation policies (topic 44) as threats to310
national sovereignty and expected detrimental impacts to the economy (topic311
25). Renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind (topic 8) as well312
as biofuels (topic 18) are almost always presented as inadequate solutions on313
their own. Fossil fuel production (topic 2), on the other hand, is discussed in314
positive terms, typically in relation to energy independence and technological315
innovation. For instance, an expansion of oil drilling into the Arctic National316
Wildlife Refuge (ANWAR) has been framed as an “important part of a pro-317
consumer energy policy” that will make energy “plentiful and affordable” (CEI,318
March 14, 2005). The harmful impacts of regulation in the energy sector, such319
as GHG emissions reductions (topic 29), automobile fuel standards (topic 47)320
and cap-and-trade policy (topic 35), are also discussed negatively. For instance:321
Whether the American economy is booming or heading off a fiscal cliff, the right322
time for a carbon tax is never (Heritage Foundation, January 8, 2013).323
[A] carbon tax would raise family energy prices by more than $500 per year, jack324
up gasoline prices 50 cents per gallon, reduce family income by nearly $2,000,325
and cost 1 million jobs by 2016 alone. Since developing nations like China and326
India will continue increasing their CO2 no matter what the U.S. does, a carbon327
tax is a bad solution to a still-unproven problem (CFACT, February 15, 2013).328
Overall, the Lieberman-Warner bill promises substantial hardship for the econ-329
omy overall, for jobs, and for energy costs. Given current economic concerns and330
energy prices, this is the last thing the American people need. At the same time,331
the environmental benefits would likely be small to nonexistent. The Lieberman-332
Warner bill fails any reasonable cost-benefit test (Heritage Foundation, May 30,333
2008).334
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Further, the integrity of climate scientists is also frequently questioned, es-335
pecially in relation to the peer-review process of the IPCC (topic 27) and other336
perceived violations of scientific integrity (topic 14) such as the so-called “cli-337
mategate” email controversy of late 2009 which supposedly has dealt a “death338
blow” to the global warming “fraud” (Heartland Institute, Nov. 21, 2009). Nu-339
merous documents take aim at the credibility of climate scientists; the following340
excerpt serving as a typical example.341
The purloined letters show a climate-science community in full tribal mode, con-342
spiring to suppress contrary findings in the peer-reviewed literature; excluding343
contrary peer-reviewed publications from IPCC reports; concealing the shoddy344
nature of climate data; colluding to hide data and destroy correspondence; and345
using mathematical tricks to produce ever more alarming-looking charts (Amer-346
ican Enterprise Institute, Nov. 25, 2009).347
These conspiracy-based themes are related to a broader trend within the corpus348
of equating scientific findings on climate change with “alarmism” (topic 16),349
where individual scientists and activists are presented as fomenting a state of350
panic based on inconclusive or even fabricated evidence. Al Gore, for example,351
has been accused of using “distorted evidence” to further a “scare-them-green352
agenda” (CEI, March 16, 2007). More generally, “global warming alarmists”,353
such as climate scientist Michael Mann, are accused of being in the business354
of “spreading myths and misinformation to further their agenda” (Heartland355
Institute, June 29, 2012). For example:356
Mann’s claims that human’s [sic] have caused tremendous warming over the last357
100 years and that the 1990s were the warmest decade are untenable [...] Looking358
at the data, the global warming scare appears to be merely ‘Mann made’ junk359
science (NCPA, July 12, 2004).360
5. Assessing model quality: reliability and validity361
It is crucial when coding themes to establish sufficient levels of reliability and362
validity. Traditionally, difficulties associated with determining reliability have363
plagued content analytic studies, as a single coder’s judgements may be highly364
subjective. While subsequent studies have shown that relying on multiple coders365
and establishing sufficient inter-coder reliability may yield consistent measure-366
ment in repeated trials, few content analytic studies in the literature on climate367
scepticism report any reliability estimates. This is understandable given that368
reproducing measures based on traditional methods is a costly endeavour. On369
the other hand, this is one area where automated approaches excel—improved370
reliability is often considered a key benefit of employing a computer-assisted371
approach (Laver and Garry 2000, Laver et al. 2003). Once the text is collected372
and the model is programmed, the measuring procedure should yield exactly the373
same results in repeated trials.374
Although the benefits of employing automated methods for reliability are375
clear, the same cannot be said for validity and thus the onus is on the researcher376
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to establish the soundness of their results when using computer-assisted ap-377
proaches. Grimmer and Stewart (2013), in a review of the text analysis litera-378
ture in political science, argue emphatically for the need to “[v]alidate, validate,379
validate,” stating “that what should be avoided, then, is the blind use of any380
method without a validation step” (pg. 5). This section devotes considerable381
attention to this “validation step,” using multiple methods to examine diverse382
conceptions of validity. Specifically, we 1) provide further evidence of the se-383
mantic validity of our findings, 2) assess predictive validity via external events,384
and 3) examine concurrent validity by comparing the model output to a human385
gold standard.386
5.1. Semantic validity and topic similarity387
While the descriptive labels described in Section 4.1 offer initial support for388
semantic validity, an additional means of examining this criterion assesses the389
extent to which topics relate to one another in substantively meaningful ways390
(Quinn et al. 2010). Note that a “topic” in the LDA model is represented by391
a probability distribution—i.e., the distribution of words given the topic—and392
thus the notion of “topic similarity” centres on the distance between two proba-393
bility distributions. While there are a number of metrics available for examining394
the distance between probability distributions, a common approach is to rely on395
the well-known Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence or the related Jensen-Shannon396
divergence (JSD). We examine similarity (or dissimilarity) using the square root397
of JSD (sometimes referred to as Jensen-Shannon “distance”), which rescales398
the JSD into a proper metric (Endres and Schindelin 2003, Osterreicher and399
Vajda 2003). Intuitively, when two topic distributions are more similar, they400
will share a smaller JS distance and vice versa. Figure 1 presents this infor-401
mation graphically by mapping the pairwise distances onto a two dimensional402
space using classic multi-dimensional scaling (Gower 1966). Topics that address403
similar themes—and thus rely on similar words with high probability—should404
be relatively close to one another in Figure 1, while dissimilar themes should be405
further way.406
The results of this analysis are striking. First, we observe a set of meaningful407
clusters, with topics related to politics, policy and regulation, energy, climate408
science, and scientific integrity located in distinct areas of the figure. Moreover,409
when looking within the principal areas, the topics also cluster as expected. For410
instance, considering the “Policy & Regulation” theme, topics associated with411
government regulation (15 and 38) inhabit the lower portion of the cluster which412
is closer to the “Domestic & Int‘l Politics” cluster, while the upper area deals413
with themes more associated with government planning (22, 32, and 33). It is414
not a surprise that Tax & Spend (32), for example, is closer to the “Energy”415
cluster, as most discussions related to energy policy involve burdensome taxes on416
fossil fuel consumption. Second, the distance between the four main issue areas417
fits with intuition. As expected, “Energy”, “Policy & Regulation” and “Do-418
mestic & Int‘l Politics” are quite far away from the “Science” cluster. Perhaps419
most interesting, however, are the findings associated with scientific integrity.420
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Figure 1: Topic similarities. The figure presents Jenson-Shannon distances projected
onto a 2D space via multi-dimensional scaling. The size of plotted label corresponds
to the number of times the topic was sampled in the corpus and thus gives a rough
indication of topic importance. Topics using similar words will be closer together in
the figure and vice versa. To ease visualization, we plot the convex hull for each cluster
in grey.
Not only do topics dealing with scientific misconduct—both regarding scientists421
themselves, the scientific consensus on AGW, and the IPCC in general—form422
their own distinct cluster, the language used seems to have more in common with423
politics than science; that is, scientists are presumed to wield “junk science” to424
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Figure 2: Predictive validity based on external events. The graphs illustrate the
average monthly topic proportions of four topics over the period January 1998 – August
2013. A local polynomial trend line is included to assist interpretation.
achieve political aims. Lastly, a number of topics are at the crossroads between425
important issue areas. For example, Climate adaptation (37) is located at the426
nexus between science and policy, which is not surprising given that adapta-427
tion focuses on using climate science to understand the adverse impact of global428
warming and implementing polices to prevent or mitigate potential damage.429
What is surprising is that a simple model based on word co-occurrences is able430
to detect this nuance. Taken together, we find that the 47 topics cluster onto a431
smaller set of theoretically meaningful and valid higher-order themes.432
5.2. Predictive validity and topic dynamics433
To further assess the quality of our classifications, this section examines434
the predictive validity of the estimated model—i.e., the extent to which our435
topics are predicted by external events (Quinn et al. 2010). However, prior to436
examining the relationship between key contrarian claims and external events,437
it is necessary to decide on a suitable measure of topic prevalence over time. We438
turn to this challenge in the next section.439
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5.2.1. Measuring topic prevalence over time440
There is little agreement in the literature regarding the “best” way to com-441
bine underlying topic probabilities to produce aggregate level measures and, as442
with issues of measurement more generally, the appropriateness of an item is443
often contingent on the research question under consideration. While assumed444
measures may vary in a number of different ways, the key question for under-445
standing contrarian claims over time is whether one captures absolute or relative446
topic prevalence. An absolute measure allows the “information pie” to grow over447
time, while its relative counterpart holds the pie constant, instead focusing on448
the competition among counter-claims within a specified time frame. We rely on449
two measures—one absolute and the other relative—to formulate the descriptive450
analysis below. The first (absolute) measure simply sums the topic proportions451
for a particular topic in a given period of time (e.g. the proportions for the452
“Alarmism” topic during December 2008), while the second (relative) focuses453
on the mean topic proportion within a specified time frame. One implicit as-454
sumption is that each measure gives equal weight to the topic proportions across455
documents and thus ignores document length. Given the extremely skewed dis-456
tribution of word lengths in our corpus, however, the proposed measures offer457
a more stable estimate of topic prevalence and avoid the equally problematic458
assumption that document importance scales linearly with word length. More-459
over, estimates using a suitable nonlinear transformation of the word counts460
(e.g., taking the log) offer virtually identical results in both cases and thus our461
measurement choice appears robust.462
5.2.2. Assessing predictive validity via external events463
Figure 2 provides the mean topic proportion for two topics, Cap & trade (35)464
and Scientific misconduct (14), for each month over the period from January465
1998 to August 2013. First, turning to cap-and-trade (see the top panel of466
Figure 2(a)) two months—May 2008 and August 2009—clearly stand out. The467
first large peak coincides with the Senate vote on the Lieberman-Warner bill468
(America’s Climate Security Act of 2007). Significant opposition to the bill found469
within the corpus largely argues that the legislation would do massive damage470
to the national economy while offering modest to no environmental benefits.471
The second significant spike occurs in August 2009, just after House approval of472
the Waxman-Markey bill (American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009).473
Similar types of arguments that were used against the Lieberman-Warner bill474
also surfaced during the Waxman-Markey period. Following the defeat of the475
Waxman-Markey bill, we see a sharp decline in discussions surrounding emissions476
reduction legislation. However, a resurgence of the topic occurs in 2013, with477
much attention being placed on the dangers of a carbon tax for the economy.478
Figure 2(b) displays the share of words dealing with a scientific misconduct479
theme. A sustained period of interest seems to cover the 2003-2005 period,480
with the release of papers from climate sceptics such as Stephen McIntyre, Ross481
McKitrick, and Hans von Storch, which criticize Michael Mann’s methodology.482
The next substantial increase in the topic proportion is observed in July 2006,483
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when Congressional hearings were held on the validity of Mann and colleagues’484
findings. However, a real break in the series occurs in November-December485
2009. This is expected since this period coincides with the time when emails of486
researchers from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East487
Anglia were hacked, uploaded to the Internet, and subsequently scrutinized by488
climate sceptics. Following this flurry of attention to scientific integrity during489
late 2009 and early 2010, a downward trend then follows with significant peaks490
occurring in July 2010 when the Independent Climate Change Email Review491
was released and December 2011 which was just after a second round of CRU492
emails were uploaded to the Internet; an incident named “climategate II” by493
climate sceptics.494
Overall, the evidence in Figure 2 suggests that the data produced by the495
model vary in predictable ways based on closely related external events and, as496
such, exhibit adequate levels of predictive validity. Moreover, in the interest of497
space, we limited our discussion to two key topics in the area of climate policy498
and science. However, many other topics—such as extreme weather, interna-499
tional negotiations, and energy policy—display similar patterns of predictive500
validity.501
5.3. Assessing concurrent validity via a human “gold standard”502
As a last look at validity, we compare the model’s classifications to those of503
two human coders using a random sample of 300 manually annotated documents.504
After ensuring a suitable level of inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff’s α = 0.74),505
the coders classified the primary topic or theme of each article using either the506
47 categories provided in Table 2 or “other” if none of the model-based topics507
suitably captured the main theme.2 Based on these data, the micro-averaged508
precision and recall for classifying the primary topic are 0.64 and 0.65, respec-509
tively. These figures are encouraging, as coding a document into 47 categories510
is a difficult classification task and the model performs considerably better than511
rolling a 47 sided die or simply choosing the modal value. More importantly512
for the analysis below, aggregating the topics to produce more general themes513
or classes greatly improves each measure of performance. When aggregating all514
the way up to the science label used in Section 6, the precision and recall are515
0.94 and 0.96, respectively; for the policy label, the precision and recall are 0.94516
and 0.92, respectively..517
It is also important to note that assessing a topic model using only the518
primary topic offers a conservative estimate of performance. Several distinct519
themes often contribute to a document’s composition and deciding which is520
2The coders consisted of one author and a research assistant. In the pilot phase, to get
a general sense of the coding task, each coder carried out an initial coding of 10 randomly
selected documents, which was followed by an in-depth discussion of coding choices. Following
this initial round, the coders went on to code an additional 30 documents and the discussion
was repeated. Finally, the coders went through a random sample of 50 documents—this is the
sample used to calculate inter-coder reliability.
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“primary” is often quite difficult for both human and machine. Indeed, allowing521
documents to be composed of multiple topics—an appropriate assumption for522
the vast majority of texts in our corpus—is one of the major advantages of using523
the LDA. Notably, the proportion of documents correctly classified jumps to524
0.78 if one considers the first two most probable topics based on the model.525
6. Policy versus science: Is the era of science denial over?526
In 2013, the World Wildlife Fund-UK’s chief advisor on climate change, Leo527
Hickman, stated in no uncertain terms that “[t]he real world is leaving behind528
those who flatly reject the science underpinning the notion that anthropogenic529
greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet,” arguing that climate science530
sceptics are being replaced by “climate policy sceptics.” More recently, in July531
2015, Elliott Negin from the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed to a more532
modest retreat: “[deniers] now concede that climate change is real, but reject the533
scientific consensus that human activity—mainly burning fossil fuels—is driving534
it.” These arguments are not new. Speculation regarding the decline of scientific535
scepticism is seen as early as 2002, just two years after McCright and Dunalp’s536
seminal study. In a leaked memo to the Republican party, conservative strategist537
Frank Luntz suggests:538
The scientific debate remains open. Voters believe that there is no539
consensus about global warming within the scientific community.540
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled,541
their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore,542
you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a pri-543
mary issue in the debate, and defer to scientists and other experts544
in the field [...] The scientific debate is closing [against us] but not545
yet closed. There is still a window of opportunity to challenge the546
science.3547
If indeed the window of opportunity for scientific scepticism has closed, this548
would be a welcome development for proponents of climate action. After all, a549
general acceptance of anthropogenic global warming is a necessary condition for a550
comprehensive agreement on climate change mitigation and there is considerable551
evidence to suggest that acknowledging the scientific consensus on AGW predicts552
support for climate policy (Ding et al. 2011, McCright et al. 2013, van der Linden553
et al. 2015). However, based on existing evidence in the literature, it is difficult554
(if not impossible) to discern whether the era of climate science denial is truly555
over or if the organised denial of “junk” science remains alive and well.556
To examine this question, we present evidence on the evolution of the CTT557
science- and policy-related discourse since the late 1990s. Figure 3(a) presents558
3Italics are in original. The full text of the environmental policy section of the Luntz memo
can be accessed at https://www.motherjones.com/files/LuntzResearch_environment.pdf.
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Figure 3: The evolution of political and science-related discourse. Panel (a) displays
the summed quarterly topic probability of “science” (solid) and “politics & policy”
(dotted) related themes for all CTTs in the sample over the period January 1998 –
August 2013. These categories are aggregations of the topics based on the codings dis-
played in Table 2. The bottom panel shows the average quarterly topic probabilities—a
relative measure—for the same categories; (b) uses all available data, while (c) excludes
Co2Science. The areas around each series represent the bootstrapped 95% confidence
interval.
18
the sum of the topic proportions for “science” and “politics & policy” related559
topics for each quarter over the Q1/1998–Q3/2013 period (absolute measure),560
while Figures 3(b) and (c) provide mean topic probabilities (relative measure).561
Each time series also includes an estimate of uncertainty, as measured by a562
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.4 These categories are aggregations of563
topics following the codings presented in Table 2. Several aspects of Figure 3 are564
noteworthy. First, in absolute terms, the intensity of discussion—regardless of565
whether the focus is on “science” or “politics & policy”—has grown considerably566
since McCright and Dunlap (2000). Consistent with broader trends in media567
coverage of climate change, (e.g. Schmidt et al. 2013), the discussion increases568
until around the time of the Copenhagen conference and the so-called climategate569
scandal (late 2009–early 2010), and then declines thereafter. Moreover, these570
data suggest that science-related discussions have been dominant since 2012.571
We thus find little evidence for the “end of science denial” and yet a rise in572
“policy sceptics” remains consistent with the data.573
Second, as demonstrated in Figure 3(b), recent years are marked by a di-574
vergence between the science and policy series: the relative emphasis on science575
seems to be gaining in the post-“climategate” era. Nevertheless, this result is576
largely driven by the influence of one prolific science-oriented CTT, Co2Science,577
which produces a steady stream of scientific review articles (see Table 1). When578
excluding this organization, as shown in Figure 3(c), we see that policy-related579
discussion is frequent, there has been convergence between the frequency of580
policy and science discussion at key periods, and that aggregate discussions of581
science appear to be on the rise after 2012.582
However, aggregating across diverse science and political themes, as shown583
in Figure 3, masks important heterogeneity in sceptical discourse. Some or-584
ganizations focus almost entirely on producing science-oriented content (e.g.,585
Co2Science), others are dedicated to addressing issues surrounding climate pol-586
icy (e.g., the Heritage Foundation), and still others focus on a range of both587
science and policy related topics. In the later category, the Heartland Insti-588
tute stands out as an important counter-movement organisation worthy of a589
closer look. As proudly trumpeted on its website, Heartland has been described590
by mainstream news sources as “the world’s most prominent think tank pro-591
moting scepticism about man-made climate change” (The Economist) and “the592
primary American organization pushing climate change scepticism” (The New593
York Times). These “accolades” are not by chance. Judging from our data (see594
Table 1), it is clear that Heartland has been a front-runner in CTT literature595
production and has been a leader in public outreach. Indeed, Heartland has been596
recognized by scholars as a significant contrarian actor and has been prominently597
studied in past literature on organised climate scepticism (McCright and Dunlap598
4Note that to remain as consistent as possible with the assumed data generating process, we
conducted the bootstrap at the document level for each time period of interest in the sample.
Specifically, for a given quarter, we sample (with replacement) from the available documents
and calculate topic prevalence, repeating this process for 1,000 replicates for each series.
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Figure 4: The Heartland Institute’s political and science-related discourse. Displays
average quarterly topic probabilities for science- and policy-related themes in docu-
ments disseminated by Heartland over the period January 1998–August 2013.
2003, Cann 2015).599
How then, does its discourse on “science” and “politics & policy” related600
themes compare to the general trend illustrated in Figure 3? We narrow our601
focus on Heartland in Figure 4, which shows how beginning in 2002, we can602
observe a steady rise in an emphasis on topics related to science, as well as an603
attendant decline in policy-oriented themes. Interestingly, Heartland’s shift to-604
wards science-related themes preceeded “climategate” by more than 7 years and605
actually dovetails with Luntz’s famous “Straight Talk” memo. It is therefore not606
a surprise that for a decade it has organized the annual International Conference607
on Climate Change (also known as Denial-a-Palooza) which serves as a forum608
for climate science deniers,5 or that it made headlines in 2012 after launching a609
controversial ad campaign which equated climate scientists with Ted Kaczynski610
(the Unabomber). The consistent trade-off of attention from policy to science611
since 2002 suggests that Heartland has invested heavily in attempting to re-open612
the “window of science scepticism.”613
Another potential source of heterogeneity relates to our categorizations of614
science and policy related discussions. It is clear that some topics labelled as615
“policy” are only tangentially related to “climate” policy and that there are im-616
portant differences between climate science and scientific integrity. We therefore617
examine three themes which are directly related to climate science and policy:618
“Science,” “Scientific Integrity,” and “Energy and Emissions Policy.” Figure 5619
5http://www.desmogblog.com/directory/vocabulary/2782
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Figure 5: Climate-specific related themes over time. The figures show the average
quarterly topic proportions of three topic clusters, which are directly related to climate
science and policy, as classified in Section 5.1: “Science,” “Scientific Integrity,” and
“Energy and Emissions Policy.” Note that Co2Science has been excluded from this
analysis. The series covers the period Q1/1998–Q3/2013.
provides the results of this comparison. Several features of this figure are notable.620
First, considering the “Scientific Integrity” series, there has been an appreciable621
rise in the prevalence of integrity-related topics starting in 2004 and peaking in622
2011. Second, talk of scientific integrity began to overtake that of energy policy623
during 2006 and 2007—which corresponds to a period dominated by An Inconve-624
nient Truth and Al Gore’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize—and proceeded625
to become relatively more prevalent in the post-“climategate” era (Figure 5 (a)).626
Lastly, while the discussion of climate “Science” was more frequent relative to627
“Scientific Integrity” from 1998 to roughly 2004, the two series become inter-628
twined for much of the sample period. This suggests that CTTs were just as629
likely to question the integrity of individual scientists and scientific bodies than630
to discuss alternative scientific viewpoints; though, there has been a percepti-631
21
ble break since 2012, with discussions of “Science” once again dominating the632
conversation.633
7. Conclusion634
Despite urgent calls to action among climate scientists, the U.S. government635
continues to avoid comprehensive climate policy action and the American public636
remains misinformed on key aspects of the debate. A growing literature draws at-637
tention to the influence of a well-organized and well-funded movement of climate638
sceptics. This study provided the first systematic update of the claims making639
activity of conservative think tanks—a critical piece of the climate counter-640
movement—since the influential work of McCright and Dunlap (2000). Our key641
findings include:642
1. The overall level of CTT claims-making has grown rapidly over the past643
decade and a half, reaching a peak during late 2009–early 2010;644
2. The 19 CTTs studied address a wide range of topics in their written com-645
munication since McCright and Dunlap (2000), which cluster into distinct646
themes associated with politics, policy, science, and scientific integrity;647
3. Topics questioning the integrity of individual scientists and scientific bodies648
appear closer (semantically) to politics than science, suggesting that claims649
often considered the hallmark of scientific scepticism are rooted in politics;650
4. The era of climate science denial is not over. While the aggregate re-651
sults demonstrate that both policy and science discussions remain stable652
throughout the period of study (Figure 3), a detailed analysis of a criti-653
cal CTT (Figure 4) and a focus on climate change-specific themes (Figure654
5) reveal the increased importance of both science and scientific integrity655
discussions over the sample period.656
5. CTTs tend to react to the external environment—i.e., they counter claims—657
and thus studies focusing on narrow intervals of time (or a single organi-658
sation) are likely sensitive to these contextual factors.659
It is important to note, however, that the current study has a number of lim-660
itations. First, we are necessarily restricted to the documents that are publicly661
available online. It should be noted, however, that these organisations have an662
incentive to distribute what they produce, which could support validity, but this663
tendency may be weaker for documents produced further back in time. Second,664
we do not transcribe video and audio data, which may be included in future665
work. Third, and more importantly, we do not perform any sentiment analysis666
on the corpus. For instance, if a document focuses on the Medieval Warm Pe-667
riod (topic 37), we are assuming that its argument is that natural forces have668
a stronger climate impact than human activity. Based on our reading of the669
corpus, as well as our theoretical priors, this is a plausible assumption. Despite670
these limitations, in providing this corpus to the community, we hope to offer a671
platform for future work on the claims-making activity of CTTs.672
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